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A study of the relationship between the principles
of Self-Defense and Freedom of the Sea prior to and sub-
sequent to the Second World War to determine whether these
principles have undergone changes, and if so, how the
changes affect their contemporary interaction.
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"No State is authorized to interfere
with navigation of other States on
the seas in times of peace except .
.
in extraordinary cases of self-de-
fense .
"
This excerpt from Judge Moore's dissent in the Lotus
Case , ^generally sets the theme for an examination of the
interaction between the principles of self-defense and
freedom of the sea. The importance of conducting such an
examination has been best stated as follows:
...all peoples can benefit most from
a public order of the oceans which
secures for all the highest possible
degree of shared access to ocean re-
sources and of shared competence over
ocean activities and... that a public
order adequate to such ends can only
be established and maintained by
people's effective recognition and
understanding of their common interests,
with continuous reassessment in the
context of the development and change
characteristic of the contemporary
world. 2
It can be appreciated that the communal use of the sea might
lease of the S.S. Lotus, P.C.I. J., Ser. A., No. 10, at
69 (1927).
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be the most effective way in which it can be used for the
benefit of all and further, that communal use must be governed
by an order to promote effective use and prevent abuse.
This order would hopefully define the rights of the users
of the sea and those affected by such use and further,
provide machinery for the settlement of disputes. Generally,
this order or international law, would attempt to obviate
the need for unilateral forceful settlement of claims.
The principle of self-defense interplays with that
of freedom of the seas in at least three ways: first, a
particular use of the sea may include in its justification
the right of self-defense; secondly, the protection of pre-
viously justified use of the sea against interference; and,
finally, the use of the sea to prevent interference with
a right in no way connected with the sea.
It is the aim of this paper to examine the relation-
ship between self-defense and freedom of the sea prior to
and subsequent to the second world war and to attempt to
determine whether these principles have undergone changes
and, if so, how those changes affect contemporary inter-
action between the principles.
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The format of the examination will include a separate
consideration of the principles with a brief history of each
followed by their application to a number of situations in
which the United States has initiated defense programs
that have caused interaction between a free use of the seas
and self-defense.
Chapter II
Freedom of the Sea
A. Meaning
It is perhaps best to illustrate the meaning of the
term "freedom of the seas" by considering the contemporary
and least controversial norms peculiar to this principle.
While considering these norms, there should be an awareness
that all states, not merely those bordering on the sea, are
concerned about the sea and how its use will affect their
interest. 3 This awareness hopefully will make it easier
to appreciate the exigency of maintaining a freedom of use
in, on and above the oceans of the world.
(1) Those who make use of the sea, including the
air above and the bed below, may do so for any reasonable
purpose not expressly or impliedly prohibited by inter-
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national law, for instance, sea and air navigation, fishing,
laying of cables and naval maneuvers. The right to use the
sea is thus tempered by reasonableness and the measure of
reasonableness should be the effect of a given use or ex-
clusion of use upon the common interest of the international
community.
(2) Each member of the international community may
exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas over vessels
it authorizes to sail under its protection; however, customary
international law recognizes a number of exceptions: hot
pursuit, i.e. if a ship of state A violates the laws of
state B while within waters over which state B is recognized
by the international community to exercise sovereign con-
trol, state B may pursue the vessel of state A beyond these
territorial waters into the high sea if this is so necessary
to apprehend the vessel and pursuit is uninterrupted. It
should here be noted that while the doctrine of hot pursuit
is generally accepted in international law, that area of
the sea over which a state may exercise sovereign control
4Fur Seal Arbitration, 1 Int. Arb. 755, (1893); Schwarzen-
berger, the Fundamental Principles of International Law, 1
Recuel des Cours, 360, (1955).
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is extremely unsettled; any member of the international
community may exercise jurisdiction over pirate vessels; 6
any nation may take jurisdiction over a collision case. 7
(3) The right of innocent passage allows a merchant
ship to pass through the territorial waters of another
state if prudent navigation so dictates that such a course
is the most desirable to reach a given destination. 8 There
is, however, a controversy over the right of a warship to
make innocent passage.
^
(4) Vessels in distress have free access to any
port in the international community. The mere fact that
a vessel claiming distress reaches port under her own power
does not deprive her of the right to hospitality, since a
master cannot be expected to delay seeking shelter until
his vessel is in danger of sinking. However, the actuality
5See, Law of Naval Warfare, NtCP 10-2, para 412, n 4,
(19 ) for a listing of the various limits of the territorial
sea claimed by states in the international community.
6U.S. v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820).
7The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885).
8Jessup, The L?w of Territorial Waters and Maritime Juris-
diction 120, (1927)
.
9Jessup, United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
59 Colura. L. Rev. 247-48 (1959); Cf, McDougal and Burke, The
Public Order of the Oceans 206, (1962) It is maintained that
the International Court of Justice, in the Corfu Channel Case,
upheld the right of a war ship to make innocent passage through
territorial waters.
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of the distress will be carefully scrutinized to prevent
the working of fraud.
(5) No state may exercise sovereignty over any portion
of the surface of the high sea. It should be noted that
this principle was not perfected without controversy. Until
the end of the 18th century the majority of Europe's littoral
states pretended to exercise sovereignty over vast bodies of
12
ocean and presently the trend seems to be reverting to this
* * • 13position. **
In summary, the above mentioned norms seemingly evi-
dence a contemporary community recognition that the oceans
are susceptible to community use. However, despite the
recognition of these benefits, the free uses of the sea
are necessarily qualified, first, because freedom cannot
10Tbe New York, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 59 (1818) 68. Majority
opinion, delivered by Livingston, J. stated: "The necessity
must be urgent, and proceed from such a state of things as
may be supposed to produce on the mind of a skilled mariner,
a well-grounded apprenhension of the loss of vessel and cargo,
or the lives of the crew. It is not every injury that may be
received which will excuse the violation of laws of trade
accidents happen in every voyage..."
11Colombos, International L*w of the Sea 44, (5th ed. 1962).
12 Id. at 45.
l3Chile, Equador, Peru and El Salvador have extended their
territorial sea outward two-hundred miles; the United States,
historically a proponent of the three mile territorial sea,
reluctantly proposed an extention of the territorial sea to six
miles at the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea; Sch-
warzenberger , the Fundamental Principles of International Law,
1 Receuil des Cours, 366 (1955).
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exist without restriction to guarantee an equality of use
to all, and secondly, because states are unwilling at present
to forego control over adjacent ocean area which they deem
necessary to their vital interest, military and economic.
B. Qualification of Free Use of the Oceans
1 . Territorial Sea
The concept of the territorial sea seems to be the
remnant of the principle of exclusive soverenigty over the
sea prevalent before and during the greater part of the 18th
century.
*
4 The principal maritime powers of the later 18th
century, led by Great Britain, recognized that the advances
in spacial uses of the sea rendered the doctrine of absolute
sovereignty detrimental to further progress in this direction
and Grotius* Mare Liber um superceded Selden's Mare Clausum.
However, states were not ready to wholly abandon the concept
of sovereignty over those portions of the sea adjacent to the
state. There is and was the lingering fear that loss of
sovereignty over this area of the sea would be coincident to
loss of economic rights, and the ability to defend against
seaward agression. Innocent passage is the single exception
that exclusive sovereignity has conceded to freedom of the seas
140p. cit. supra n. 8 at 44.
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The rapid technological advances in methods of economic
exploitation of sea resources, nutritional and mineral, and
sophisticated military offensive and defensive systems have
apparently caused many states to press for an extension of
the territorial sea, rather than searching for adequate
protection through methods that would cause minimum delimi-
tation of the free use of the sea. Thus, it appears that
unless such a trend is halted, the principle of freedom
of the seas will regress rather than evolve.
2. The High Seas and The Contiguous Zone.
"As distinct from national waters and the territorial
sea, the high seas are those parts of the interlinking chain
of oceans which lie to the seaward of the territorial seas. 1 ' 1*
It is within the high sea and the air above the high sea that
the principle of freedom of use is primarily applicable, innocent
passage being the single exception of any import and this relevant
only to tne sea, not the air above the sea. The contiguous
150p. cit. supra, r. 13.
l6Schwar;;enberger , The fundamental Principles of International
Law, 1 Recuel des Cours , 358 (1955).
-8-





zone is an undefined area of the sea and air ^vbove the sea
within the high sea. In the contiguous zone, a state may
exercise limited, reasonable, and, hopefully,, temporary
authority, despite an incidental delimination of the free
use of the sea.
The United States has recognized the contiguous 2one
concept for more than one-hundred and fifty years. In the
case of Church v. Hubbart
,
13Cbief Justice Marshall held that
a state had the right to exercise authority on the high sea if the
exercise of such authority was reasonable. He equated reason-
ableness to acceptance by the other members of the international
community of the uniliateral exericse of the particular auth-
ority. Marshall's test of acceptance raises the issue of the
less powerful state having to accept the dictates of the
ore powerful state, in which case the "reasonableness" would
be subject to question. If possible, the reasonableness of an
exercise of authority would be better tested by an institution
similar to the World Court, having jurisdiction over such matters
or by treaty.
* 7/Vrticle 24 of the 1960 Convention on the Law of the Sea
does limit the contiguous zone by definition to 12 miles. This
limitation is contrary to the concept of the contiguous zone
and the current practice of the major maritime countries.
186 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, (1804), "If these laws are such as
unnecessarily to vex and harass foreign lawful commerce, foreign
nations ,vill resist their exericse. If they are reasonable and
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Tr.e function of the contiguous ?one s: be "
to serve :vs a safety valve from the rigidities of the terri-
torial sea, permitting the satisfaction of particular reason-
able demands through the exercise of limited Uttthorlty. •**•
The contiguous zone concept should then allow realization of
certain contemporary necessities of | state, defense, economic
and sanitary, without the almost total impingement on free
use of the sea permitted by the territorial sc . ncept. Thus,
the contiguous zone concept is presently a way to afford the
most equitable balance between exclusive and inclusive claims
20to the sea. Even more importantly, the contiguous zone
concept provides a possible escape from the trend towards
extension of sovereignty on the oceans. There is no denying
that the contemporary climate of the international community
seems to require exercise of authority beyond territorial
limits, •'but hopefully man can obtain a more favorable climate
and therefore it would be unwise to accept an extension of the
190p. cit. supra n. 2 at 76
^Inclusive claims would be those made by non- littoral and
littoral states to keep the sea free cf burdens to navigation,
fishing, etc., while exclusive claimants demand complete con-
trol of certain portions of the sea necessary to protect their
security, economic and/or xailitary.
''•'-Even Great Britain, historically antagonistic towards the
contiguous zone concept, has shown signs of relenting, "Nearly
a century has now passed since trie unsatisfactory dispute with
Spain (over tti/t British Hovering Acts) was allowed to die out,
and since then the government of Great Britain has shown an in-
creasing reluctance to resist actively such claims by other
states as can be justified on the principle of self-defense."
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rigid territorial sea concept, thereby making it more diffi-
cult to retreat therefrom .hen retreat becomes feasible.
".
.
,/s/overeignty is not necessarily in-
divisible, and a comprehensive, continuing
competence is easily distinguished from a
particular, occasioned competence;... it
should require little emphasis that states
need not, and surely do not make claims to
sovereignty over adjacent waters when they
assert claims only to an occasional com-
petence to proscribe for the protection
of certain particular interests in speci-
fied contexts. The simple dichotomy,
'sovereignty' - 'no sovereignty,' is far
from adequate to describe the complex dis-
tribution among states of inclusive <\nd
exclusive coiapetences over the use of the
oceans."22
The recognition of at least the necessity of the con-
tiguous zone is best evidenced by the results of the 1958
2°
'"Cit. at supra n. 2 at 610.
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This Con-
vention was attended by representatives of most of the states
in the world community.^-* The Convention considered the
contiguous zone concept and adopted an Article which reads
as follows:
(1) In a ?one of the high seas contiguous to
its territorial sea, the coastal State
may exercise the control necess-rv to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its cus-
toms, fiscal, immigration or sani-
tary regulations within its terri-
tory or territorial sea:
(b) Punish infringement of the above
regulations committed within its
territory or territorial sea:
(2) The contiguous zone may not extend beyond
tv/elvc miles from the baseline fron which
the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.
(3) Where the coasts of two States are opposite
or adjacent to each other, neither of the
two States is entitled, falling agreement
between them to the contrary, to extend its
contiguous zone beyond the median line every
point on the baseline from which the breadth
of the territorial seas of the two States
is Btiisurt
The conception of Article 24 can be triced to a 1956
2:JUnited Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, II
Official Records, xii-xxvii (1958).
24t)nited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art.
24, Convention on the High Seas and Contiguous Zone. (1958)
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United Nations.' - The limitation of the contiguous zone to
twelve miles and tnc purposeful exclusion ox "security" from with.
in the protectable category of intercctir' evidence on i.
etical approach to the maintainancc of the frc. of
the seas. Tne contemporary world situation will not allow
such • narrow construction. Advanced ojethocs of fishing,
extracting minerals from the sea ana C terns
that spon continents, &ake it essential for states to employ
the contiguous zone concept for aefense of their vital in-
terests. 27
In summary, the principle of freedom of the sea should
direct towards t freedom of use, with only functional limi-
tations, through which all states may equitably share in the
25International Law Commission, Report, U.N. General Assembly,
Official Records, p. 39. 11th Session, Supp. No. 9 (U.N. Doc.
No. A/3159); United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Official Records, Vol. 3, p. 40 (U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13) (1958)
-60p. cit. oupra n. 2, at 604 "The Commission (International
Law Commission) not only conceived its positive recommendation
narrowly, out also undertook to identify interests it thought
coastal states specifically should not be permitted to protect
in the contiguous zone. The Commission thus specifically
Bised are not indue irx;
as justification that 'the extreme vagueness of the term sec-
urity' would open the way for wtmiertti"
27In 1951 there were at least 18 states that claimed con-
tiguous zones for security reasons. Boggs, National Claims
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The right to practice 3elf-defense is common to every
major system of law, 2iJhowcver , its legal function, i.e., what
rights may be defended and when they may defended will be
dictated by the nature and development of the system of law in
which it must operate. 2^ In the international community, for
instance, the absence of centralized international order could
elevate the principle of self-defense to a right of the highest
order while the acquisition of centralized authority would
evidence a decline in the precedence of self-defense as center al
authority assumed responsibility for the protection of the
28jenks
f
The Common Law of Man 143 (1958).
29So-.vett , So If -Deftai
cit. supra n. 16 at 342.









"On the level of unorganized international society,
the problem of self-defense is entangled intricately with
that of the place of war in international law,"30 since if
states could legally resort to war at will, the function of
self-defense would be minimal. Accordingly, a short con-
sideration of the historic right to resort to war in international
law will aid in understanding the evolution of the principle
of self-defense.
The international community evidences a long history
of struggle in its attempt to bring war within the law. Each
formulation of a doctrine to distinguish just and unjust war
has been ..."so elastic that state practice found little
difficulty in justifying in terms of just war any type of
war, be it preventive or down right aggressive." 3 ^-
Short of war, there were forms of self-help and re-
prisal in those situations in which a state failed, under
customary international law, to live up to its responsi-
bilities. In these situations, a state could either submit
to these limited forms of pressure32or resist by force. If
300p. cit. supra n. 16 at 327.
31ld. at 328; Hitler justified the German invasion of Poland
in 1939 on the grounds of self-defense.
32For instance, pacific blockade, embargo, and naval demon-
strations displaying a show of strength.
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it is assumed that reprisals were lawful , it roust be conceded
that resistance to their lawful appreciation would be illegal,
however, in the unorganized society of international law, there
existed no objective judge of their legality. "Thus, a state
may treat them as illegal and apply counter-reprisals. More*
over, if a state contests the legality of such reprisals,
it is always in a position to plead self-defense." 33
The first "concrete" step toward the elimination of
war was taken in 1928, in the Kellog-Briand Pact, in which
the use of war as a national policy was declared to be illegal.
The text of the Kellog-Briand Pact did not mention the
principle of self-defense but the position of the United
States as set forth by Mr. Kellog, then Secretary of State,
34
made it obvious that a war in self-defense was justifiable.
Thus the principle of self-defense, which by circumstances
had been confined in application to situations short of war, 35
was shifted to center stage in the world arena. It now became
33Op. cit. supra n. 16 at 328.
34Mr. Kellog' s note of June 23, 1928 stated that, "there is
nothing in the American draft of the anti-war treaty which re-
stricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defense. That
right is inherent in every sovereign state and implicit in every
treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of
treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or in-
vasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances
require resort to war in self-defense. " (emphasis mine).
35So long as agressive war was justifiable under customary
international law, the principle of self-defense was primarily
considered only in exertions of force short of war.
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necessary to formulate just what customary international law
meant by self-defense, since this principle alone would
justify unilateral resort to war.
1. Self-Defense in Customary International Law
The precepts of self-defense erainating from the
1838 negotiations between the United States and Great
Britain concerning an invasion of United States terri-
torial integrity by the British, "are worthy of note, since
they seem to have been adopted by international law to both
justify and criticize use of force. It is to Daniel ! <2bster,
in his capacity as secretary of state for the United States,
that the credit must be given for formulating those precepts
in the following definition of when self-defense may be used:
'•A government alleging self-defense must show a necessity of
self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means
and no moment for deliberation."37 in addition to Webster's
formula treating the question of when self-defense may be
exerted, the Caroline and McLeod episode, out of which these
36The Caroline and McLeod Cases, II Moores Digest 409.
37Letter from the Secretary of State to the British Minister,
6 Works of Daniel Webster 306 (12th ed. 1860) (emphasis mine).
-17-
m ©no qxonxaq aid* ©onia .©andiab-ilaa yd tatam
w*J ifinoxtfinislnl yxeaotaiO ni ©en©x©a-il»e .1
©rf* moil onxJanxm© ©an©j©b~il©a 10 ztqvoaiq »dT
Ja©iD bn& a©J**8 b©jxnU ©dj n©»w*©d anoi*«x*OD©n 8£8J
"-1"9* as**** b©*xnU xo noiafivnx rw pnxn^s^noo nxs*x:r8
©onxa
t ©:fon 10 yrfJso* ©iBde ,riax*xia d y*x:io©*ni iei^oJ
ritod o* vt&t ifinoi^m9?nx yd bajqobi; n»©d © t m©9a y©d*
,l»ta )in&a o* ex *I .©oioi 10 oau ©^iDxtl-io fan* yii*
<as>*£*8 bstxnU srii iox ©J&Je 20 yifile*o»a a* yjj aid
alqo'j»oiq ©aod* enxJfiluaaoi iox n©vxQ ©d Jauta *xb©io ©d* */r.rf*
:b9zu ©d yam ©enaiab-xlaa n©dw xo nox*±nxi9b pnxwoiloi ©d* ni
*° VJJ«B»QBfi a worla jau» ©en©i©b-xl©a IXa tnamniovoQ
ana©m 10 aoxodp on pnlvs©!
t ynltni&(lwiovo t in&*anx ,©an©29b-il©a
a"j©xad©W ot noxtxbb^ ni ' .noi*ai©dx.fob 201 xnewom on farm
©d yam ©ansisb-ilsa n©rfw 20 noxJadup ©ri* pnx**©2* aluniox
©a©dt rioirfw 10 *uo ,©boaxq© booJoM bcu> ©nxioi&D 29x9
*> ^asgia a©iooM II r aag>o bogJotf one, s
I oj£.J£ 10 y2**©2D 1 *9J*9j^£
*( dn
.t© d^cx) e>t at*a 1 d
negotions grew, treated of what rights a state might defend.
The case stands for the proposition in customary international
law that territorial integrity is "on one hand.... a right
which may be protected by the exercise of self-defense, and
on the other it may be subject to the right of self-defense
of other states." This concept would equally apply to ships
by applying the fiction that a ship represents the territory
of its flag.
The obvious contextual difficulty with Mr. Webster's
test is its subjectivity. While it is true that given an
organized judicial system the application of Mr. Webster*
s
test would be as capable of judicial determination, as the
reasonable man test, in an unorganized international society,
permitting each state to exert force based on its own subjective
appraisal of necessity causes untold difficulty. The lack of
an effective judicial organization to determine the legality
of an exertion of force in self-defense render© the test less
than perfect.
380p. cit. supra n. 29 at 31.
3QCf. McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minium World Public
Order, 217 (1958) which states that the language of Mr. webster's
test if read litterally, ...."is cast in language so abstractly
restrictive as almost.... to impose paralysis."
40por example, the judgement of the International Court of
Justice in the Corfu Channel Case, however, this court has
jurisdiction only if the parties involved volutarily submit.
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The proposition in Caroline and McLeod that a state
might go outside its territory into the territory of another
for purposes of* self-defense, made it relatively easy to support
a contention that states could exert force in the high sea
adjacent to their territory. If the sovereign territory of
a state could be invaded in the name of self-defense, surely
the high sea would be subject to the same condition. Church
v. Hubbard recognized the application of this principle to
situations occurring on the high seas.
The application of the principle of self-defense to
situations arising on the high seas seems to have been sus-
tained or justified on the basis of reciprocity. In an un-
organized international society, the problems stimulating
recourse to delimiting actions have been coincident to most,
if not all, littoral states. "There is, however, no agree-
ment on the precise nature of the circumstances wh ich enable
this protective jurisdiction to be exercised or on the forms
of prevention of which a state may have recourse in the
exercise of its right to self-defense."43 Based on this ad-
mittedly vague principle, it has been the practice of states
to exercise jurisdiction in waters adjacent to the territorial
410p. cit. supra n. 29 At 66.
42Op. cit. supra n. 18.
430p. cit. supra., n. 29 at 66,
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sea for the protection of fishing, sanitation, customs, rights,
44
and security.
In the latter part of the 19th century the United States
seized a number of unlicensed British Columbian sealing
schooners operating outside United States territorial waters
in the Behring Sea. The British protested the seizures and
the United States and Britain agreed to submit the dispute
to arbitration. 45 The United States counsel contended before
the arbitrator that "the right of self -defense. . .is a perfect
and paramount right to which all others are subordinate; that
it extends to all material interests.
.
.important to be de-
fended; that in time, place, the manner, and the extent of
its execution, it is limited only by the actual necessity
of the particular case;..."46 The Tribunal of Arbitration
found in favor of Britain, rejecting the above claim47as well
as the United States contention that there was a property
interest in the seals, the seals having come from United States
territory. 48 Thus, the right of a state to protect is possible
440p. cit. supra, n. 8 at 105.
450ppenheim, International Lnw 620 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955)
^Fur Seal Arbitration, 1 Int. Arb. 839-40 (1893).
47Cheng, General Principles of Law 94, (1953).
48id. at 499.
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vital foodsource was subsumed to the principle of the free
use of the seas. '
Again, self-defense has been the basis upon which states
exercised authority in the waters adjacent to the territorial
sea for the protection of customs, fiscal and sanitary regula-
tions. ° It was considered that the same basis existed for
the protection of these interests as existed for the pro-
tection of territorial integrity, i.e., conditions of entry,
51
even though perhaps in a lesser degree.
Customary international law has long recognized state
practice of exercising authority in waters adjacent to their
territorial seas for the purpose of security. 2 Again, the
justification seems to be reciprocity.
In 1873, * ship of American registry, the Virginius,
was apprehended by a Spanish warship on the high seas while
in the vicinity of Cuba, at that time a Spanish possession.
49British counsel in the Pur Seal Arbitration made a state-
ment to the effect that if the purpose of the British fishermen
was not to exercise their own rights but to maliciously inter-
fere with the rights of the United States, such action would
be improper and the President of the Tribunal concurred; Op.
cit. supra, n. 8 at 121-22.
500p. cit. supra, n. 8 at 105.
51Op. cit. supra, n. 29 at 67.
52op. cit. supra, n. 8 at 96.
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The Spanish claimed that the vessal was fictiously registered
and carrying arms to Cuban insurgents. The Spanish, on this
basis, considered the act piracy and executed the crew which
53included American and British subjects. The United States
and Britain protested the executions but not the seizure of
the ships, apparently considering the principle of self-
defense as justification for the seizure .^ 5and , at the same
time, as a prohibition to the executions. Thus, it is seen
that while self-defense may be proper in a given instance,
the application of excessive force might alter the role of
the defender to that of the agressor.
In summary, the examples are many for the proposition
that international customary law recognized the right of a
state to exercise force in defense of its rights even at
the expense of the rights of others in situations concerned
with the high seas. 56 It is even possible to formulate a
53 II Moore's Digest 380, 895.
54In a later case, the Mary Lowel, the United States argued
before the Anglo American Mixed Claim Commission, that the
support of this theory of self-defense was contra to the principle
of freedom of the seas. Ill Moore 1 s Arbitrations 2772-2777.
55Fur Seal Arbitration; Japanese invasion of Manchuria in
1931; German invasion of Norway; Church v. Hubbard; Virginus;
Caroline; Custom and fiscal regulations.
560p. cit. supra, n.29 at 11.
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a definition of self-defense in customary international law.
Self-defense might be said to be the privilege of a state
to lawfully exert force against another state or against in-
dividuals to a degree necessary to protect its vital interests
,
military and/or economic, from illegal acts or omissions
.
Self-
defense does not include: (1) Self-help, which, though
similarly dependent upon a prior illegal act, does not function
to preserve the status quo but rather effects reprisals to
enforce an international duty that would attach to the per-
petrator of the illegal act; (2) Necessity and/or self-
preservation which stand for a mere recognition that ability
to abide by law is limited and therefore the failure to do so
in given circumstances will excuse the illegal act or omission.
The first difficulty with this definition is the in-
ability of an unorganized international society to objectively
determine the categories of illegal acts or omissions. Sub-
sequently, each state uses a subjective criterion based upon
its vital interest as it sees them. The inevitable result
is the equation of self-defense to self-help, necessity, or
self-preservation.
57Op. cit. supra, n. 16, at 342.
58Op. cit. supra, n. 16 at 342.
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The second difficulty arises in deciding v^hen , assuming
there is an agreed upon right that may be defended by force,
a state may resort to force.
It is fitting to end this very brief discussion of self,
defense in customary international law with the observation
made by John Bassett Moore that "...the attempt to so define
self-defense that its future application would be clear and
practically automatic is just as futile as the attempt to
define agression has been...."^^
2. Self-Defense Subsecuent to World War II
Consideration of the principle of self-defense subse-
quent to world war II is in affect a consideration of the
United Notions Charter, man's best effort to date in his de-
sire to establish order under law. Any consideration of the
Charter profits by first examining the purposes of the or-
ganization as set forth in its preamble and first article.
The preamble states,
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
to save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
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worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations
large and small, and to establish con-
ditions under which justice and respect
for the obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law
can be maintained, and to promote social
progress and better standards of life in
larger freedom,
AND FOR THESE ENDS
to practice tolerance and live together in
peace with on another as good neighbors,
and to unite our strength to maintain in-
ternational peace and security, and to en-
sure, by the acceptance of principles and
the institution of methods , that armed force
shall not be used, save in the common in-
terest, and to employ international mach-
inery for the promotion of the economic
and social advancement of all peoples.
HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO
ACCOMPLISH THESE A IK 8
Accordingly, our respective Governments,
through representatives assembled in the
city of San Francisco, who have exhibited
their full powers found to be in good and
due form, have agreed to the present Charter
of the United Nations and do hereby estab-
lish an international organization to be
known as the United Nations.
Article I states the purposes of the United Nntions Organizations,
and they are
:
1 . To maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by
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peaceful ueans
,
and in conformity with
the principles of justice and inter-
national law, adjustment or settlement
of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in
solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humani-
tarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedom for all
without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions
of nations in the attainment of these com-
mon ends.
This introduction to the United Nations Charter, as
might be expected, gives a clearer picture of where the in-
ternational community has been and where it hopes to go rather
than the particulars of how it plans to get there. The parti-
culars of the plan are set forth in the body of the Charter
and like all particulars, are most relevant when considered
in context. Thus, it might be argued that unless the pur-
poses and goals of the preamble and first article, or in other
words, the materials that determine the contextual reference
of the Charter, are continually in mind when examining any
given subsequent article, the likelyhood of the misinterpre-
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tation of the article is greatly enhanced.
It was noted earlier that the Kellog-Briand Pact
prohibited signatory states from using war as a tool of
national policy. Article II, section 4 of the United
Nations Charter strengthed and added to that prohibition.
The Article states,
The Organization and its Members, in pur-
suit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,
shall act in accordance with the following
Principles.
4. All Members shall refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat
or use of force against territorial
integrity or political independence
of any state or in any other wanner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.
Thus the threat of force was included in the prohibition
and use of the word "war," which had created problems^ in
the Kellog-Briand Pact, was excluded. This change of approach
to the problem of control of war through law is not surprising
when considered in context. As the Preamble of the United
Nations Charter states, "We the People of the United Nations
determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war, which twise in our life time has brought untold sorrow to
mankind ....." the second war not only more destructive than
6°Countries exerted force without declaring war thereby hav-
ing the argument that "war" was not being used as a national
policy in contravention of the Kellog-Briand Pact.
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the first but a preview that the third would be more des-
tructive than man's ir.inc could comprehend.
A consideration of Article 2, section 4 in conjunction
with the purposes of the United Nations, can arguably result
in a conclusion that the Article proscribed even the use or
threat of force in self-defense. While all would agree that
self-defense was a basic principle, few would argue with its
history of abuse and hence the selection of the greater good
might arguably justify the elmination of the principle in the
interest of world peace. Either this or some other unknown
factor caused the delegates at San Francisco to press for
and finally adopt an Article defining the right of a state
to exert force in self-defense either collectively or in-
dividually.
There are those who maintain that no additional article
was necessary because, under their interpretation of Article 2,
section 4 and the purposes of the United Nations, the principle
of self-defense as recognized by customary international law
was in no way limited by Article 2. * It can be assumed that
a number of delegates in San Francisco did not share this
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m because their fears were sufficient to cause the adoption
of Article 51 which reads as follows:
"Nothing in the present Charter shal l
impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to main -
tain international peace and security .
Measures taken by members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security
Counci I and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security."
The language of Article 51 evidences an obvious re-
cognition of an existing, inherent right of self-defense.
Docs it attetapt to redefine the uses of this inherent right?
There can be little argument that it does attempt to redefine
the use of the right of self-defense. The Article requires
a member using force in self-defense to report such use to
the United Nations Security Council and to permit the Council
"...to take at any time such action as rt deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Such was not the case in customary international law where a
state could continue to exert force until the danger was removed.
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This is no little sacrifice. The- state *M now required to
submit to the will of the United Nations in combating what
it considered to be a danger to itself. The above example
negates the argument that Article 51 merely restates the
customary international legal rights of a nation to act in
its defense.
The reason for this limitation is clear. If the
United Nations was to fulfil its stated purposes it could
hardly Allow its members or non-members to continue an ini-
tial exertion of force uncontroled. Accordingly, the right
to resort to unilaterial or collective self-defense was re-
duced to an interim measure. If this limitation is so obvious,
it does not appear unreasonable to examine the language for
additional limitations, particularly in face of the logic,
that control of the initial right to exert force would assist
in effectuating the purposes of the United Nations more so
than control of the force subsequent to its initial exertion.
An examination of the language of the Article in this context
causes the examiner to pause in the very first sentence, "No-
thing.
. .shall impair the.
. .right ... .of self-defense if an















to assume that this 1 was originally rue ant to prohibit
a state, individually or collectively, frou. resorting to the
use of force until it suffered an armed attack? To exclude
this possibility on the sole basis that the contemporary state
of world affairs so dictates, would seem to ignore the con-
text in which the Article was drafted, as well as the stated
purposes of the United Nations. This argument is not meant
to imply that contemporary considerations of self-defense
should ignore the present state of affairs, but that perhaps
contemporary considerations of self-defense, rather than
attempting to justify individual or collective right to re-
sort to use of force in self-defense on a unrealistic inter-
pretation of what Article 51 meant when it was drafted, admit
that Article 51 and the United Nations failed to present the
hoped for framework within which the use of force could be
controled. This admission would perhaps clear the air and
allow the search to continue for a suitable framework within
which the exertion of force will be subsumed to law.
-31-
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Chapter III
Contemporary Self-Defense Measures
Affecting the Free Use of the Sea
The concept of self-defense is not limited in cover-
age to those situations concerning nuclear attack or simi-
lar extreme situations. 6 Article 2 section 4 of the United
Nations Charter does not include the term "war" and as pre-
viously stated, the juridical difficulties coincident with
its use have been avoided, however, the positive benefit
derived from the exclusion of the term is the broadening
of control to include situations that may escalate as well
as those that are extremely dangerous per se. The foresight
here present, whether actual or imagined, has been bene-
ficial. It is not the thre \t of nuclear war or armed invasion
that daily confronts the decision makers but the lesser and
more subtle exertions of force and threats to do so. There-
fore, the proposition that all acts of states interfereing
with the free use of the sea must look to the Charter for
justification is valid, particularly those situations which
may depend on force for their implementation.
There are at least three areas in which the principle
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of self-defense may interact with the principle of free-
dome of the sea: first, sel MM may be given weight,
along with other factors, in determining the reasonableness
of a particular use of the sea. For example, naval maneuvers
might interfere with the free use of the sea but self-defense
may make the interference reasonable; secondly, after a
particular use of the sea is deemed reasonable, self-defense
becomes relevant in the protection of the said use, for ex-
ample, upon which occasions and to what extend may force
be used to prevent interference with naval maneuvers; and
finally, interference with the free use of the sea to pre-
vent the maturation of • threat which is in no way connected
with the sea, for example, a naval blockade to prevent impor-
tation of weapons that may be used against the state imposing
the blockade.
The evolution of world politics since the termination
of World War II and the stagger ing technological advances in
both exploitation of sea resources and Methods of destruction,
have prompted the United States to employ certain measures
or devices vhich it considers necessary to protect national
and hemispheric interests, military and economic. Some of
these measures or devices interfere in varying degrees with
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the rights of others to use the sea and the air above the
sea, and therefore, inust be examined as to degree of inter-
ference and implementing force required for their xaaintance
if a proper analysis is to be made as to their reasonableness
and hence acceptability in international law.
The United States, on a number of occasions, has
for all intents and purposes closed off vast reaches of the
Pacific Ocean to conduct nuclear weapons tests? On first
consideration this degree of interference would appear un-
reasonable if for no other reason than the scope of the area
involved, however, an examination of the attending facts re-
duces the unpal at ability and uncovers evidence upon which an
argument of reasonable use might be bottomed.
There is no inconsistency per se in maintaining that
a nation may not exercise "sovereignty" over any portion of
the high sea and simultaneously attempting to justify the
position of the United States as concerns the Pacific nuclear
cDougal and Schlt-i, The Hydrogen Boiub Tests in Per-
spective 64 Yale L. J. 648, 660 (1954-1955).
64For example see U.S. Navy ilydrographic Office, Notice
to Mariners, pt. 2. No. 21, P»ra. 2716 (May 23, 1953) which
declared a zone covering some 400,000 square miles of the
South Pacific as unsafe during and for sometime after the
testing of nuclear weapons.
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weapons tests . The principle of freedom of the seas is of
major importance to the community of nations, but it can
hardly be maintained that all other interests of the inter-
national community should be subsumed to this single principle. ^
It has been illustrated above that an occasional, temporary
competence over a portion of the oceans is not necessarily
within the historical prohibition of comprehensive, continu-
ing competence embodied in the meaning of the term "sover-
eignty." An application of the theoretical proposition that
the oceans in their entirety must be free at all times to
all would be users, contravenes the very purpose of freedom
of the sea, i.e. that the sea be used to the benefit of the
entire community.
The simplest justification of this use would be the
remoteness of the area of ocean in which the nuclear weapons
were tested. This area was removed from any major shipping
lanes or major fishing grounds thus the United States, while
cognizant of its right to use the sea, evidenced a considera-
tion of rights of others to do likewise. 68 Additionally, the
650p. cit. supra n. 63 at 663.
66See text at n. 22.
670p. cit. supra, n. 63 at 682-683.
68For example, the Soviet Union conducted nuclear weapons
tests in a remote part of the Pacific Ocean.
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United States may further support the reasonableness of this
use with the claim of necessity in the interest of self-
defense and scientific progress. The tests were surely not
mere arbitrary usings of a resource for the purpose of
exercising a right, but a purposeful and beneficial use.
The remoteness of the area chosen for nuclear weapons
testing minimizes the aspect of sn implementing force to keep
the area free of eowmerical sea and air traffic, however, it
does not remove the necessity for a consideration o£ this
subject. If it is assumed that the use of a particular area
of the ocean is reasonable and further that the nature of
the use will permit of only a single user at a given time,
has anyone the right to interfere with the user? In the
context of this problem the answer would be no, but the more
important issue is by what means interference can be pre-
vented and by whom. Unfortunately there is no acceptable
contemporary solution if the solution is sought within the
framework of effective control of unilateral exertion of
force by international law, as it must be if force is to be
effectively controled. A state Might subscribe to this
view but at the same time xt uust be cognizant of the fact
that an interim method of enforcement is necessitated in cer-
-36-
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tain situations. This ieterle uethod might be labeled
''administrative police I mould hopefully be used
sparingly and without force of arms where possible. Without
such an interim measure the interaction of states takes on
a otv p<~-ct
.
The United states has constructed radar towers out-
side the territorial waters to provide yarning of the approach
of unidenxified aircraft. The tovtrs are removed froti coru-
merci^i areas and use no more space than a modern merchant
ship at anchor. As discussed above, the United States has
a right to use the ocean and incidental reasonable inter-
ference resulting therefrom is an accepted requisite of use.
The interference with the free use of the sea attributable
to the radar towers is dininimus &n<i few would argue as to
its reasonableness, whether on the basis of self-defense
or air '.gation safety. However j there regains the pro-
blem of protection of the re >la use against interference
and in this regard, the radar towers are analogous to the
eUQaear weapon tests. Neither situation %Toul.i permit the
use o" Llitary force to pro-vent interference in the absence
of ar attack and each is of .. tare thi .ows the use
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of lesser, or administrative force, to prevent interference.
The air defense warning systems employed by the United States
are also justifiable on the s we basis plus the additional
justification of a condition of entry since the United States
]uires identification for only inbound aircraft.
In October 1962 the United Stater, ascertained that the
blic of Cuba hid agreed to allow the Soviet Union to set
up operational medium range Llee with nuclear capability
in Cuba. The government of the United tes considered this
ant so dangerous to western hemispheric security that it
took action to prevent its implementation. The action of the
United States included a naval blockade of Cuba which was
designed to prevent the importation of missiles. The war-
ships employed in the blockade 'ere ordered to halt any
ship capable of carrying a niseile, search it. and prevent
it fro i tring Cuba if it 3 Led missiles. Assuming,
without deciding, that the rotation of the Soviet-
Cuban agreement vould const! tu ; threat of force in vio-
lation of Article 2, section 4 of the United rations Charter,





In the nuclear testing situation discussed above, the
United States was making reasonable use of the* tea ->nd ny
question of force involved a protection of that right to use
tea. In the Cuban Blockade, the Unit ras not
attei protect its right to Main reasonable use of
the sea but was restricting through the use of force, the
right of others to use the sea in order to protect yet
another right, i.e., territorial integrity.
The application of force to prevent a complete- y free
use of the sea is not contrary per se to the principle of
freedom of the sea, i.e., the enforcer ent of custom or sani-
tary regulations. However , it is here that some limitation
of ''administrative police powers" must be established in order
to avoid an application of excessive force. The nature and
purpose of administrative enforcement prcc 1 lee the employ-
ment of military Machinery to accc its ends.'" it
can therefore be concluded that a blockade ol* Cub tl by United
Statei .; not within the category of nistrative
police powers but obviously in the c ty of *elf-def*enae
involving a Military committment. Thus, while onilatex
6 ^For example, the regulations pertaining to the sea are
enforced by the Unite vtes Coast Guard, an organization
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force of an administrative nature might be used within the
scope of the United Nations to protect territorial integrity
in the absence of an "armed attack," the same cannot be said
for the use of military force absent an armed attack, There-
fore, if it is granted that self-defense in customary inter-
national law was altered by the United Nations Charter to
exclude the exertion of unilateral or collective force with-
out its direction, except in the case of armed attack, the
action of the United States was contrary to international
law.
The defense of rights that may affect the use of the
sea is not confined to matters pertaining to military security,
In 1945, the United States proclaimed that the natural re-
sources of the sub-soil and sea-bed of its continental shelf7^
were subject to its jurisdiction and control. 71 This con-
tinental shelf concept was readily accepted in the inter-
national community as is evidenced by results of the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 72 Article 2 of which
states in part,
70A submarine plain bordering the majority of continents
which drops off sharply at depths varying from 100 to 200
fathoms
.
71Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 59 Stat. 884 (1945).
72The Convention on the Continental Shelf was adopted by
the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, April
29, 1958.
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1. The coastal State exercises over
the continental shelf sovereign
rights for the purpose of ex-
ploring it and exploiting its
natural resources.
Therefore, unlike the weapon testing in the Pacific discussed
above, there is here less need to justify the use of the
sea prior to attacking the problem of defending that right
should others interfere with its exercise. However, in
the area of defense of the established right they appear
to warrant identical solution, each being of a nature that
would permit the use of "force," i.e., administrative force
which is distinguishable from the concept of "force" as it
is used in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.
To summarize, the principle of self-defense was
limited by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in 1945
in hopes that the limitation would aid in the overall pur-
pose of the Charter to bring the use of force effectively
within the rule of international law. The force or coercion
at which the Charter was directed was that type of force or
coercion which by its very nature either resulted in clash of
arms or was very likely to escalate to such a state. Co-
ercions of a relatively low level of intensity and magnitude,
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in an international community of states interacting and
competing and which are directed, not against an individual
state but against all states, were not meant to be included
within the prohibition for to do so would impede international
73




Which of these two principles of international law
is most important and in what framwork will the term ''im-
portant" be defined? The framework roust be the mutual bene-
fit of the international community. If the principle of
self-defense is minimized will there be a true community left
to enjoy the benefits, present and predicted, of the sea?
It is obviously asking too much of a state to totally fore-
go the right to use force in self-defense but this is neither
proposed or necessary. There is a middle ground on which
states might accept limitations upon its right to exert force
in self-defense in turn for safeguards that minimize the
risk of doing so. However, before any such system can be
realized there must be a willingness on the part of states
to reexamine the archaic "feelings" about nationalist! with
73Op. cit. supra, n. 62 at 212-13.
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a view towards replacing them with contemporary "thoughts"
about nationalism. The quantum gains in technology shrink
the world daily and nations must learn to cooperate if there
is to be long term mutual benefit rather than short term
nationalistic benefit.
Within the framework of mutual benefit to the inter-
national community, the principle of freedom of the sea
should progress while the principle of self-defense should
decline in proportion to the growth of effective control of
force through law. For this reason the principle of freedom
of the sea might be considered superior to the principle
of self-defense, however, the contemporary world scene dictates
that the former be subsumed to the latter until there is
effective international control of force through law.
It is difficult to disagree with the purpose of the
United Nations but it is more difficult to disagree with the
proposition that the mechanics through which these purposes
hoped to be realized have failed. The greatest failure has
unfortunately been in the area which offered the only real
solution to control of force through peace, The International
Court of Justice. All members of the United Nations are
members of the Court, however, submission to its jurisdiction
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is voluntary and even then it may be conditional.
If the machinery for effective control of force through
law has failed to function as planned, can the law, in this
case the limitation of the principle of self-defense by
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, be ignored? One
author answers the question as follows:
...the rule of the Charter against unilateral
force in international relations is the essence
of any meaningful concept of law between na-
tions, and the foundation on which rest all
other attempts to regulate international be-
havior... I see nothing in present inter-
national society - in the cold war, in terrible
weapons, in new nations, in the consequent
changes in the United Nations - to suggest
that it is desirable or necessary to modify
or relax that law. Indeed, the new weapons
and the new terrors of war, yet undreamed
of when the Charter was written, render it
even more important that law should exert
its every influence to deternations from
initiating any force which might expand
and escalate into total destruction. The
interests of nations, their wants of secu-
rity and welfare, even their quests for
justice and human rights, must be pursued
by many other means, but not by unilateral
force. 75
Others maintain that states must revert to customary inter-
national law in the face of the failure of the United Nations
74A11 members of the United Nations are members of the Inter-
nations 1 Court but membership is not synonomous with submission
to its jurisdiction. Submission to the Courts jurisdiction is
on a voluntary basis and even then can be conditional. As of
1961 only 39 nations had volutarily submitted to jurisdiction
and these submissions included a rayread of conditions. Larson,
When Nation Disagree 73, (1961).
75Henkin, Proceedings of the American Society of International
Law 153, (1963 )
.
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to effectively control force.
Of the first position it roust be asked by which
..."many other means'*. . .may the affective security interest
of a nation be pursued, for example, in the Cuban blockage.
What were the alternatives? Non. Was the interference
with the free use of the sea through force illegal in in-
ternational law? Yes, the law has not been repealed merely
because the enforcement machinery has failed to function.
The maximum, rebus sec stantibus is unhelpful if an
affective legal order is hoped to be achieved.
The United States, with her great military and economic
power, has a hegemonious responsibility to move the inter-
national community towards the goal of affective legal con-
trol of force but this responsibility also includes a duty
to assure that international community arrives in one piece
thus there will be times when it considers the use of a
minimal amount of force, unilaterally applied, necessary
if the overall goal is to be obtained. There are obvious
imperfections in such a course of action but in an imperfect
world these are to be expected and should not be justified
76If the basis upon which an international agreement was
made no longer exist or have radically altered, the agree-
ment no longer binds.
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through a process of legal gynnastics in order to prove them
"legal."
The principle of a free sea embodies the foundation
of a community interest that cannot be ignored. "We need
to build a world community of interests before we can
77
establish a world regime under law." ' Only the sea of all
man's resources has proved susceptible of communal use and
hopefully the sea will give birth to the "community of in-
terest" necessary for existence under law as it gave birth
to man himself.
77Patterson, Men and Idea3 of the Law 414, (1953).
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